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NSC BRIEFING

30 May 1960

USSR

- I. We now have some reports of action behind the scenes during Khrushchev's stop in Berlin on his return from Paris.
- A. The East German leaders, who were visibly disappointed by Khrushchev's postponement of a peace treaty, apparently repeatedly urged him to act right now on a separate treaty.
1. But Khrushchev refused to be committed to any timetable. He agreed only to Ulbricht's suggestion that the question be taken up through diplomatic channels.
- B. East German leaders are now reported to feel that the German and Berlin questions will not be solved at the summit level.
1. They believe Khrushchev will propose separate treaties with both German states.
2. After the west rejects this offer, Khrushchev will then be free to act unilaterally on an East German treaty.
- C. Khrushchev is reported to have agreed with Ulbricht that there is little likelihood that another summit conference will be held.
1. In his speech in Moscow on 26 May, Khrushchev expressed the hope that a new summit conference would take place, but he added that he would not be surprised if this did not occur.
2. Khrushchev has called for Chinese participation at future summit meetings.

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3. He may intend to use western rejection of this demand as a means of getting around his commitment to maintain the status quo in Germany until a new summit meeting is held.
4. In any case, however, no action on Berlin or Germany is expected until after the six to eight month period has elapsed.

II. Khrushchev's latest speech, given to the Soviet Labor Congress this past weekend, is generally similar in tone to his Berlin speech, though tailored for his domestic audience. It confirms our view that Khrushchev is seeking to repair the damage he did in Paris to his peaceful coexistence line.

A. "This policy is just and correct," he emphasized and asked, "Why should it be changed?"

1. Other Soviet spokesmen, including a public lecturer in Moscow have stressed the temporary nature of current tensions.
2. Mme. Furtseva, for instance, now Minister of Culture, told some visiting U.S. artists of the USSR's desire to see the cultural exchange program continued and expanded.

B. As expected this does not mean any let up in efforts to intimidate free-world alliance members and countries housing U.S. bases, however.

1. Khrushchev and Malinovsky have been playing the bully to the hilt with declarations that they will strike with missiles any base from which an intruding aircraft takes off.

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- III. Without going into detail on Khrushchev's speeches, it is worth noting that he continues to try to explain and justify the contradiction between his detente policies and his performance at Paris.
- A. By asserting that he still believes the President wants peace, he is apparently seeking to forestall charges that he had made a mistake in judgement and had allowed himself to be deceived by the President.
- IV. Khrushchev displayed great sensitivity to implications in the western press that he wasn't in complete command of the situation.
- A. He went to unusual lengths to ridicule speculation that he is under pressure from the Soviet party, generals, people or the Chinese.
1. The speech, even so, seems to reflect an awareness that the Soviet people are disappointed over the summit failure and are worried that their standard of living may suffer as a result.
 2. These fears Khrushchev tried to overcome by vigorous, colorful appeals to national pride, by holding out hope for a future summit, by assurances of continued efforts in the meantime to negotiate with the West, and by stressing the promise of great improvement for the Soviet consumer set forth in the Seven Year Plan which is to be pursued with renewed vigor.
- B. Khrushchev's unusual denial that Mikoyan is in trouble does not alter the evidence which led us last week to believe this may be the case.

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1. A demotion for Mikoyan is still a possibility although any move that had been planned may now be put off for some time, as was the case with Bulganin.
- V. Two days after Khrushchev's speech to the Labor Congress, Defense Minister Malinovsky followed up with tough speech.
 - A. He warned that he personally has ordered the commander in chief of the rocket forces to strike at the base from which any future "intruder plane comes," (*intruding over USSR as well as any other bloc state*)
 1. According to TASS summary, Malinovsky did not attribute this order to a decision of the Soviet Government or party central committee, as is Khrushchev's usual custom, but justified it on the grounds that such a plane might be carrying a hydrogen bomb.
 - B. He followed Khrushchev's description that "modern war...would be a virtual catastrophe for some countries," but he then nodded in the direction of the more truculent Chinese position on the aggressive intentions of the West by adding, "We do not trust the imperialists," and, "We are convinced they are waiting only for an opportunity to attack...the socialist countries and that they are checked only by fear of the complete rout of imperialism as a system."
- VI. Despite Khrushchev's and Malinovsky's gestures of solidarity, Peiping probably remains wary of Khrushchev's possible return to detente tactics.
 - A. The Chinese, who had been unenthusiastic about the summit and found brief satisfaction in its collapse, have ~~neither published~~ *not virtually* ~~nor commented~~ *ignored* on Khrushchev's 20 May speech in East Berlin, in which he took a moderate line on future negotiations.

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B. A major theme in the most extensive anti-American campaign

ever conducted on the China mainland is that negotiations and contacts with the West cannot be pursued in view of "imperialist war preparations."

1. Chinese leaders view detente tactics and a possible future summit as unlikely to yield them any practical results and would like to nail shut the door to summit.

2.

[redacted] Peiping cannot accept any statements of American good intentions so long as the US continued to "occupy Taiwan."

C. Peiping issued the "10^{2nd}~~1st~~ serious warning" on ³⁰~~28~~ May and is highlighting American "intrusions and provocations" in an effort to prove American hostility.

1. A "liberate Taiwan" propaganda campaign such as preceded the Taiwan Strait crisis in August 1958 has thus far not been started, but we can't overlook the possibility that the Chinese may be cooking^{up}/some new move in the Taiwan Strait area.

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